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T
here is no doubt that the liberalization 
of trade and services, including financial
services, has delivered very positive results 
for the economy and employment, both in
Germany and around the world. However, in
the case of financial markets, liberalization
and deregulation went too far. It has become
evident that the financial markets need explic-
it rules. Current and future financiers need to
pay greater attention to the main purposes of
the financial sector, as well as the impact and
interdependencies their actions have: poten-
tial profits, viability, responsibility and liability
have to be integral to their business models.
Policy makers need to thoroughly reform 
the rules governing financial markets in order
to create a stable, less volatile financial sector;
one offering fair conditions for every market
participant. This, in turn, is a necessary condi-
tion for long-term, sustainable growth.
However, given the rebound in the world
economy, the momentum for reform is weak-
ening. That is why it is the German govern-
ment’s ambition for the G20 to follow through
on the global reform agenda, while Germany
moves ahead with corresponding measures at
the national and European level. 
Against this background, the German govern-
ment has already undertaken important meas-
ures and reforms. In order to address the “too
big to fail” problem, we have decided to intro-
duce a bank restructuring regime aimed at:  
 Enhancing the leeway for intervention
prior to a bank’s insolvency.
 Permitting the transfer of the systemically
important parts of a bank, with the objec-
tive of keeping them running.   
 Enabling reorganisation and restructuring
by way of negotiation and without prior
initiation of insolvency proceedings.
These measures will be complemented by 
the levying of a stability fee on banks, the 
proceeds of which will accrue in a restructur-
ing fund. This fund will allow us to make
financial institutions contribute to the costs of
crises, as well as enable us to create a cushion
against any potential future financial market
turbulence.  
Our efforts also focus on investor protection.
Many investors lost a substantial part of their
savings in the course of the financial crisis. To
prevent a replication of such losses, we are
currently drafting a bill that extends the scope
of financial instruments covered by the
investor protection provision of the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive, and which
aims to implement further measures to 
prevent mis-selling. 
False incentives in the financial sector also
need to be tackled. As a matter of fact, inap-
propriate compensation structures in the 
sector rewarded financial actors with short-
term success at the expense of the stability 
of institutions and the very financial system
itself. The German government has, therefore,
moved ahead with implementing the new
international guidelines on responsible com-
pensation practices agreed at the G20 summit
in Pittsburgh. 
Perhaps most importantly, the financial crisis
has revealed the inadequacy of existing capital
and liquidity requirements for financial insti-
tutions. G20 member states have thus rightly
called for higher capital and liquidity margins
for banks, so that they can safely weather 
larger losses and longer ‘dry spells’ in financial
markets without any risk of collapse. Here
again, Germany’s implementation of the new
guidelines under the amendment to the 
EU Banking Directive and Capital Adequacy
Directive will improve capital standards at
European banks while work is underway to
further raise the quality and level of capital
and liquidity requirements globally. A final
package of measures will be decided by end 
of this year. 
To bring new momentum to the debate on
how to further enhance and strengthen finan-
cial market regulation and oversight, I hosted
an international conference in Berlin this May.
The event brought together high-level experts
from finance ministries, central banks, inter-
national financial institutions, regulatory
authorities and academia. Participants agreed
that while great progress has been made in a
number of areas, it is clear that the reform
agenda cannot be put aside yet, and that the
remaining challenges need to be addressed in
a collective and consistent way. 
Germany is committed to implementing the
required reforms, and it is my ambition to
assume a leading role in the discussions with
our international partners.
Yours sincerely,
Dear Friends of the House of Finance,
Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble
Federal Minister of Finance  
Fotoquelle: BMF / Laurence Chaperon
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CREDIT RATING ANNOUNCEMENTS – THE IMPACT OF THE 
AGENCY’S REASON, PUBLIC INFORMATION, AND M&A
R
ating agencies are now in the lime-
light, both for academics and the
general public. Many people seem to
believe that rating agencies have become
too powerful and caused undue distress
by lowering ratings. The opposite view
states that rating agencies are merely 
followers of financial market prices 
and have only a limited impact on 
market prices. In our paper, we take a
closer look at the interaction between
rating agency actions and market prices
for stocks and credit default swaps. As 
a novel feature, we incorporate the 
reasoning behind rating agency actions
into our analysis. Indeed, we find that
the specific reason for a rating change
matters substantially for securities 
markets. Furthermore, we find that
other developments at the time, such 
as the amount of publically available
information and the contemporaneous
involvement of firms in M&A transac-
tions, influence how capital markets
react to rating announcements. 
We are interested in the factors that induce
abnormal returns in the stock market, as well
as abnormal changes in spreads in the credit
default swap (CDS) market, and consider not
only rating changes but also rating reviews by
Moody’s. Rating reviews, which are usually
concluded within a 3-month period, are often
considered a superior source of data, as it is less
likely that they are anticipated by the market.
Since ratings are intended to be an indicator of
credit-related bond price risk, rating down-
grades should be “bad” news for bond holders
(protection sellers in the CDS market) and rat-
ing upgrades should be “good” news for bond
holders. For the stock market, the situation is
ambiguous. Rating downgrades could be bad
news for stockholders if they are due to the
weakened ability of a firm to generate future
cash flows. However, they could be good news
if they are the result of an increase in leverage
which, according to Modigliani and Miller
(1958), should increase shareholder wealth 
at the expense of bondholder wealth (wealth
transfer hypothesis). Goh and Ederington
(1993) test for this wealth transfer but are
unable to confirm it.
The presence of new public information is
incorporated into this study by analyzing the
amount of general and rating-related newswire
stories, and by investigating their impact on
market prices and differences between the rea-
son categories. These data are also used to con-
struct a proxy measure for “surprise” which
allows for testing the differing level of surprise
for each type of credit rating announcement. 
The paper also takes into account the fact that
firms may be involved in M&A transactions at
the time of rating announcements. Since this is
true for roughly 40% of the sample firms con-
cerned, involvement in M&A activity can clearly
affect the overall results. This may be the case
when a rating announcement is made on the
very same day as an M&A announcement and
the observed market reaction cannot be attrib-
uted to just the rating event. 
STRONG HETEROGENEITY IN THE MARKET
RESPONSE TO RATING ANNOUNCEMENTS
First, we show that our data set is marked 
by the same patterns found in prior research.
Negative rating events induce anticipation and
announcement effects in stock and CDS mar-
Prof. Mark Wahrenburg
Goethe University
Björn Imbierowicz
Goethe University
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kets for both rating reviews and rating
changes, but no post-announcement effects.
Positive rating events, on the other hand, gen-
erate only an either statistically or economical-
ly insignificant outcome. For this reason, we
concentrate fully on negative rating events in
the subsequent analysis.
When the data are analyzed, including with
respect to the specific reason given by the 
rating agency for its announcement, we find
considerable heterogeneity. Effects prior to neg-
ative rating events in both the stock and the
CDS market are mainly a result of rating actions
due to one single reason only: changes in a
firm’s operating performance. At the same time,
firms in this reason category also experience
significantly higher media coverage in the pre-
announcement period. It seems that the mar-
ket’s ability to anticipate the rating event is a
result of new publically available information.
On the day an announcement is made, signifi-
cant abnormal returns in most reason cate-
gories can be observed. Thus, the rating agen-
cies seem to increase the flow of valuable infor-
mation to the market across all categories.
However, the magnitude and even the sign of
these effects differ across reason categories.
When rating events are prompted by a weak-
ening capital structure and an announcement
comes as a surprise to the market, stocks even
show positive returns. The corresponding
abnormal CDS spread change is positive and
indicates that a wealth transfer effect may be
taking place, from bondholders to stockholders,
as conjectured by Jorion and Zhang (2007).
M&A INVOLVEMENT HELPS EXPLAIN MARKET
REACTIONS
In the final part of the analysis, the sample is
broken down further, with a separate analysis
of each firm involved in M&A activity at the
time of the rating announcement and vice
versa: the results are striking. As regards the
anticipation effect previously detected in one
category, we find that this is generated by only
firms with no involvement in M&A activity.
The results for the announcement period sur-
prisingly show that a weakening firm capital
structure is no longer associated with signifi-
cantly positive stock price reactions. Only tar-
get firms in M&A transactions are responsible
for the previously stated evidence in favor of
the wealth transfer hypothesis. Overall, the
findings suggest that the true underlying rea-
son for rising stock prices is not any wealth
transfer from bondholders to stockholders, but
the impact of M&A-related news.
The results have important implications for the
interpretation of prior research and provide
new insights for investors. Studies which do not
account for the reasoning behind rating events
and contemporaneous M&A involvement con-
ceivably merge significant with insignificant
influences, and even incorporate opposite
effects, and should thus be interpreted with
great caution. The detected data heterogeneity
is important, not only statistically but also eco-
nomically. Besides the rating itself, the reason
for a rating change seems to serve as a proxy for
important price-relevant information that is not
incorporated in the rating information.
REFERENCES
Goh, J. C., Ederington, L. H. (1993)
“Is a Bond Rating Downgrade Bad News, Good News,
or No News for Stockholders?”,
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 2001–2008.
Jorion, Ph., Zhang, G. (2007)
“Good and Bad Credit Contagion: Evidence from
Credit Default Swaps”,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 84, 
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The full article is available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1363920
Figure 1: Average Cumulative Abnormal Performance for
Rating Reviews for Downgrade and Rating Downgrades
conditional on the Reason stated by Moody’s
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TOWARD A NEW EUROPEAN FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE IN THE
RATING SECTOR – AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND LEGAL SOLUTIONS
T
he latest downgrades of Greece,
Portugal and Spain have led to
renewed calls for curbs on credit rating
agencies. However, economic research
reveals that there are insurmountable
obstacles to effective oversight. This is
why legislative attempts to regulate 
rating agencies have been unsuccessful.
Due to the recent global financial crisis
and the related failure of rating agencies,
new proposals in this field have been put
forward. A new European regulation on
rating agencies has just entered into
force, which raises anew questions about
regulatory effectiveness and the neces-
sary financial architecture.
I. THE LIMITS OF REPUTATIONAL MECHANISMS
The economic problems in the rating sector
are rather unique in comparison to those for
other financial intermediaries. To begin with,
one would expect rating agencies to be con-
trollable ex post because their ratings can be
correlated with actual defaults. Nevertheless,
the functioning and potentially disciplinary
effect of the resulting reputational mechanism
requires free market entry. In the rating sector,
however, there seem to be insurmountable
entry barriers. First, the rating industry is
marked by considerable network effects. This
is because investors benefit from the compara-
bility of different ratings and the underlying
rating categories and, therefore, prefer ratings
from larger agencies. Over time, the two rating
norm has evolved and the majority of big
bond issues are now rated by both Moody’s
and Standard & Poor’s. Secondly, if an issuer
wants to switch from a known rating agency
to a new market entrant, he may be subject 
to lock-in effects arising from the reputation
value of ratings and may also face suspicions
of rating shopping by going away from the
well-established Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s. A third obstacle to competition in 
the rating sector is the lack of product differ-
entiation that makes it impossible for new-
comers to specialize in a certain niche market.
Since investors demand very high service
quality for any type of debt issue, a new
entrant cannot focus on certain levels of cred-
it risk, but at best can specialize on certain
regions or industries.
II.  REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REMAINING
PROBLEMS
In light of these high entry barriers, it comes as
no surprise that regulatory efforts have turned
out to be not very effective. In Europe, there
was no binding regulation until very recently.
Instead, self-regulation on the basis of the
IOSCO (International Organization of Security
Commissions) Code of Conduct issued in 2004,
which was subsequently refined in 2007 and
2008, has been implemented by most, includ-
ing the major rating agencies. The IOSCO Code
follows an input-oriented approach. It pre-
scribes rigorous, systematic methodologies open
to objective validation and the provision of
adequate personnel and financial resources for
developing, monitoring and updating ratings.
During the global credit crisis, the goal to
improve rating quality by way of increased com-
petition was increasingly attacked, since compe-
tition may raise the prospect of rating shopping,
and thus lead to a decrease in quality.
Such negative repercussions of serious con-
flicts of interest have not been adequately
addressed by legislators so far. One of the most
important is the issuer pay model, with about
Brigitte Haar
Goethe University
HOF-Newsletter_07  22.06.2010  9:19 Uhr  Seite 67
Research 2 • HoF-Newsletter • Quarter 2/2010
90% of rating agency revenues coming from
issuers who pay for their ratings. In addition,
further concerns with respect to another con-
flict of interest are expressed, when rating
agencies offer consulting or advisory services
to issuers they rate and practically become part
of the underwriting team.
III. A NEW EUROPEAN FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
AS A WAY TOWARDS REFORM
The European Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009
on rating agencies of 16 September 2009,
which was implemented under German law
on May 6, 2010, aims to diminish such con-
flicts of interest by focusing on improvements
to corporate governance and on timely disclo-
sure. Rating agencies are now obliged to have
independent compliance departments and to
review their rating methodologies periodically.
Analysts are also excluded from making any
proposals or recommendations regarding the
design of structured finance instruments due
for a rating by their agency. Transparency is
required with respect to models, methodolo-
gies, and details about both agencies’ financial
figures and the rotation systems to be installed
under the regulation.
It is beyond doubt that the regulation address-
es important questions by focusing on typical
conflicts of interest. As stipulated, enforce-
ment is left to the member states’ authorities,
which have jurisdiction to register rating agen-
cies and can, among other things, withdraw
their registration and take other necessary
enforcement measures. The latter have to be
suitable, proportionate, have a deterrent effect,
and include fines of considerable amounts in
Germany. Having said this, given the intricate
economic problems present in the rating mar-
ket, it is clear that a public regulator can only
implement second best solutions for improved
rating quality. This raises the question whether
there should not also be additional private
enforcement possibilities. Up until now,
national liability rules have failed to take hold.
This failure could be overcome by rules that
prescribe the disgorgement of profits made
from ratings that were given in violation of the
new European regime. The idea of private and
public enforcement mechanisms working side
by side would most probably contribute to an
improvement in rating quality.
Following the de Larosière report on EU finan-
cial market supervision, the European
Commission’s proposal for a regulation to
establish a European Banking Authority envis-
ages a far-reaching competence for this
authority in the rating sector. How effective
this would be, of course, remains to be seen. It
may be that additional complementary mech-
anisms, such as the private enforcement con-
sidered above or supplementary quality con-
trol by independent experts, will also be need-
ed. Nonetheless, the new European regulation
on rating agencies will soon be revised. Thus,
the rating sector could be the first branch of
the banking industry to constitute an impor-
tant building block of a truly European finan-
cial supervisory architecture; one with, how-
ever, further potential for improvement.
REFERENCES
Haar, B. (2009)
“Nachhaltige Ratingqualität durch Gewinnab-
schöpfung? – Zur Regulierung und ihrer Implemen-
tierung im Ratingsektor”,
Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft,
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Hunt, J. (2009)
“Credit Rating Agencies and the ‘Worldwide Credit
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Graph 1: Market Structure of the Rating Industry
14% Fitch 40% S&P
40% Moody's
3% AM Best
3% Other
HOF-Newsletter_07  22.06.2010  9:19 Uhr  Seite 78
Research 3 • HoF-Newsletter • Quarter 2/2010
T
he crisis of 2007-2009 has shown that
banking and financial market struc-
tures can at times interact with macro-
economic conditions and monetary poli-
cies in ways that generate financial 
disruptions and systemic instability.
Existing macro models are not well-
equipped to capture these phenomena.
The next generation of macro models,
however, should be capable of expressing
the interaction between finance and
macroeconomics, and of incorporating
the risks stemming from the interplay
between the banking sector, financial 
markets and monetary policy. What 
implications do expansionary monetary
policies have for the risk taking behavior
of banks? What role do secondary mar-
kets play in terms of igniting and foster-
ing systemic risk? What is the optimal
combination vis-à-vis macro-prudential
regulation and monetary policy? And
what are the consequences of financial
globalization for the stability of financial
markets? These, among others, are the
questions that remain to be answered fol-
lowing the financial crisis. 
A recent research program by Ester Faia
responds to these questions by building up a
benchmark for macro models which include
different aspects of the banking sector. This
program involves three main lines of research.
The first of these is a work co-authored with
Ignazio Angeloni (ECB and BRUEGEL), titled
“A Tale of Two Policies: Prudential
Regulation and Monetary Policy with
Fragile Banks”, which studies the optimal
combination of monetary and macro-pruden-
tial policies. In this paper, Angeloni and Faia
introduce optimizing banks, modeled along
the lines of Diamond and Rajan (JoF 2000 or
JPE 2001), into a macro (dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium) model. This framework is
then used to study the role of banks in the
transmission of shocks, the effects of monetary
policy when banks are exposed to runs, and
the interplay between monetary policy and
Basel-like capital ratios. Banks in the model
choose the optimal capital structure in order to
maximize the expected return for outside
investors, namely uninformed investors and
bank capitalists. In equilibrium, bank leverage
depends positively on the uncertainty of proj-
WHERE FINANCE MEETS MACRO
Ester Faia 
Goethe University
Ignazio Angeloni  
Adviser to the Executive Board
of the ECB and a 
BRUEGEL Visiting Fellow
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ects and on the bank's "relationship lender"
skills, and negatively on short-term interest
rates. A monetary restriction reduces leverage,
while a productivity or asset price boom
increases it. The transmission of all shocks
points in the direction of a risk-taking chan-
nel: low interest rates, as induced by lax mon-
etary policies or productivity booms, encour-
age banks to take on too much risk, thereby
leading to the phenomena of exuberance and
over-reaction. In this environment, pro-cycli-
cal capital ratios are destabilizing; monetary
policy can only partly offset this effect. The
optimal (utility maximizing) policy combina-
tion includes mildly anti-cyclical capital ratios
and a monetary policy response to asset prices
or leverage.
The results of the aforementioned paper are of
great policy relevance. In fact, they were
recently presented to the Executive Board of
the European Central Bank in a policy seminar.
A second line of research pursued by Ester
Faia is the role of the secondary market for
asset-backed securities (ABS) in the transmis-
sion of shocks in macro models. The financial
crisis has highlighted the limits of the "origi-
nate-to-distribute" banking model, but its
nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary
policy remains unexplored. In a paper titled
“Credit Risk Transfer and the Macro-
economy”, Ester Faia builds a macro
(dynamic stochastic general equilibrium)
model with banks, and examines its properties
with and without active secondary markets for
ABS. In this model, it is assumed that banks
are subject to liquidity shocks which may
induce them to sell loan claims on unfinished
projects in secondary markets. Both the origi-
nation and the selling activity are subject to
moral hazard problems. Firms, after having
obtained loans from the bank, might choose to
exert a low effort and thus undermine the suc-
cess of a project unless properly monitored.
Through monitoring, banks acquire private
information about firms' projects. This leads to
a second moral hazard problem between
depositors ("uninformed investors") and
banks; one which becomes even more severe
when the bank has the possibility of selling
loans on the secondary market. The bank is
inclined to offer the loan on the secondary
market in the case of a liquidity shock or if it
knows that the loan is non-performing. The
possibility of transferring credit not only
reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank
balance sheets, but also the bank incentive for
monitoring. As a result, secondary markets
free up bank capital and exacerbate the impact
of productivity and other macroeconomic
shocks on output and inflation. By offering the
possibility of capital recycling and by reducing
bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in
general equilibrium allow banks to take on
more risk. This research has been awarded the
prestigious Lamfalussy award.
The last line of research refers to a paper
which explores the consequences of financial
globalization for an optimal policy: part of a
bigger research project sponsored by an FP7
grant from the European Community,
whose team leaders are Michel Juilliard, Ester
Faia, Paul Levine, Albert Marcet, Joe
Pearlman, Marco Ratto and Volker Wieland.
More specifically, the paper is co-authored by
Ester Faia and Eleni Iliopulos and titled
“Financial Globalization, Financial Fric-
tions and Monetary Policy”. It studies the
optimal setting of monetary policy in an envi-
ronment in which foreign lending finances
expenditure on housing. The authors find that
monetary policy should target the exchange
rate rather than the domestic inflation rate in
order to contain persistent global imbalances.   
REFERENCES
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CLEAR ENFORCEMENT RULES FOR THE STABILITY
AND GROWTH PACT
D
r. Wolf Klinz is a Member of the
European Parliament (Group of the
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe). Among his manifold responsi-
bilities Dr. Klinz chairs the Special
Committee on the Financial, Economic
and Social Crisis and is a Member of
Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs.
The single currency was introduced without a
single economic and fiscal policy. The Stability
and Growth Pact was supposed to make up for
this. Has the treaty proven to be a flop?
Dr. Klinz: The basic idea that states joining
the single currency area have to meet specific
requirements, as laid down in the Stability and
Growth Pact, is still right. The challenge is that
the Pact was not respected from the very onset
by two founding members (i.e. Germany and
France) and that a lack of discipline has also
permeated other member states. If anything,
the Pact has to be strengthened with a clearly
defined sanction mechanism and clear
enforcement rules, ranging from the 'naming
and shaming' of those who violate the Pact to
loss of voting rights and penalty payments.  
Has the aspect of competitiveness been suffi-
ciently in focus?
Dr. Klinz: Clearly not! In fact, even if the
Stability and Growth Pact had been respected,
a loss in competitiveness would have caused
serious problems for members of the
European Monetary Union. Therefore, devel-
opments in the competitiveness of European
Monetary Union member states have to be
monitored closely and the impact of budgets
on economic policy evaluated regularly. 
Greece has accumulated a massive debt moun-
tain – one which will increase even further in
the coming years, regardless of what belt-
tightening measures the government takes. Do
the erratic price movements in financial mar-
kets demonstrate that investors doubt the
prospect of a long-term consolidation? 
Dr. Klinz: Indeed, markets seem to lack 
confidence that Greece will be able to turn the
corner. This is, in my opinion, mainly due to
the fact that the Greek government does not
communicate convincingly how it wants to
overcome the problems caused by: 1) tax eva-
sion; 2) corruption; and 3) the shadow econo-
my. Statements that are precise and concrete
about how progress will be made in each of
these areas are vital for calming the markets. 
Due to the turbulence caused by the financial
crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) made
extensive use of “quantitative easing” last
year. From a political perspective, how would
you evaluate this step, and will the central
bank be in a position to take appropriate
measures for tightening monetary channels
when necessary?
Dr. Klinz: The use of "quantitative easing" by
the ECB last year was timely and useful. I
never had any doubts that the ECB would
start exiting these special measures when it no
longer considered them to be necessary. I am
more worried about the ECB's recent decision
to accept “junk” government bonds as collat-
eral and to buy these bonds on the secondary
market. Whether the "sterilisation" of this
extra money supply will happen in a timely
manner and be successful remains to be seen.
Dr. Wolf Klinz 
Member of the 
European Parliament 
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T
he global financial crisis has under-
lined the lack of profound research
results in key financial subjects and the
dearth of overarching, interdisciplinary
solutions for the complex, multi-layered
problems we face today – for example,
regarding how the capital markets can be
better regulated – but also highlighted the
tremendous gap between the knowledge
derived from research and how this is
actually used and applied in political prac-
tice – in the work, for example, of politi-
cians, policy makers and public servants.
The House of Finance sees itself as not only
obliged to generate new research results,
but also to improve the “translation” of
these results for political practice. 
Thus, the Center for Financial Studies (CFS),
the Institute of Law and Finance (ILF), and the
Institute of Monetary and Financial Stability
(IMFS) have jointly initiated the House of
Finance Policy Platform. Recently comple-
mented by the E-Finance Lab, this pools
together the policy-relevant contributions of
researchers at the House of Finance and at
Goethe Uni  versity’s Faculty of Economics and
Business Administration and Faculty of Law. 
KNOWLEDGE AT A CLICK …
The policy-relevant publications of participat-
ing scholars can be downloaded from the
Policy Platform website (www.hof.uni-frank-
furt.de/de/Policy-Platform/About-us.html).
These are either available as “Policy Letters”,
i.e. short essays or commentaries on current
policy topics usually written for the media, or
as “White Papers”, which consist of research-
based contributions to ongoing policy debates.
The overall aim of these two products is to
inform political practice – and also the general
public – in a non-technical way, about issues
currently pertinent to financial markets, mon-
etary economics and central banking, and
financial law. This website presently offers 40
Policy Letters and 26 White Papers and is con-
tinuously expanding.  
… PLUS A MORE PERSONAL DIALOGUE
In addition, the Policy Platform has established
a series of workshops with renowned policy
makers. Researchers want to learn more about
the specifics of real-world problems and also
the results of investigations carried out by pub-
lic agencies. In return, they explain their own
results – as well as those of their peers around
the globe – and “translate” these for political
practice. This exchange enriches not only polit-
ical practice but also academia, as evidenced by
the new research projects inspired by such
workshops. Prof. Axel Weber, Dr. Jens Weid  -
mann und Jochen Sanio have all participated in
Policy Platform workshops.
For more information, please visit: 
http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/de/Policy-
Platform/About-us.html 
or contact info@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER BETWEEN THE HOUSE OF FINANCE AND
POLITICAL PRACTICE
Graph 1: Knowledge dissemination at the House of Finance Policy Platform
Parliaments Regulatory Body Ministries Public Services
White Papers Policy Letters Workshops
Policy Platform
at the House of Finance
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SELECTED HOUSE OF FINANCE PUBLICATIONS
Bannier, C., Behr, P., Güttler, A. (2010) 
“Rating Opaque Borrowers: Why are Unso  li  -
cited Ratings Lower?”,  
Review of Finance, Vol. 14(2), pp. 263–294
Baums, T. (2010) 
“Tim Florstedt, Zur organhaftungsrechtlichen
Aufarbeitung der Finanzmarktkrise”,  
in Die Aktiengesellschaft, pp. 315–323  
Bruggen, G. H., Spann, M., Lilien, G. L.,
Skiera, B. (2010)
“Prediction Markets as Institutional Fore  cas  -
ting Support Systems”, 
forthcoming in Decision Support Systems
Cahn, A. (2010)
“Intra-Group Loans under German Law”, 
European Company Law 7, pp. 44–50
Faia, E., Campolmi, A. (2009)
“Labor Market Institutions and Inflation
Volatility in the Euro Area”,
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 
Gerlach, S., Assenmacher-Wesche, K. (2009)
“Monetary policy and financial imbalances:
Facts and fiction”, 
forthcoming in Economic Policy
Haar, B. (2010)
“Anlegerschutz in geschlossenen Fonds –
Kapitalmarkteffizienz, Behavioral Finance
und Anlegerkoordination als Bausteine eines
neuen Regulierungsparadigmas”, 
forthcoming in Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt.
Hinz, O., Eckert, J. (2010)
“The Impact of Search and Recommendation
Systems on Sales in Electronic Commerce”,
Business & Information Systems Engineering,
Vol. 2 (2), pp. 67–77
Horneff, W., Maurer, R., Rogalla, R. (2010)
“Dynamic portfolio choice with deferred annu   -
ities”,
forthcoming in Journal of Banking and
Finance
Kühn, C., Stroh, M. (2010)
“Optimal portfolios of a small investor in a
limit order market: a shadow price approach”,
Mathematics and Financial Economics, in press
Langenbucher, K., Brenner, S., 
Gellings, M. (2010)
“Zur Nutzung von Insiderinformationen nach
der Marktmissbrauchsrichtlinie”, 
BKR – Zeitschrift für Bank- und Kapital  markt  -
recht, Vol. 4, pp. 133
Vykoukal, J., Beck, R., Wolf, M. (2010)
“Impact of Pressure for Environmental
Sustainability on Grid Assimilation – Empirical
Results from the Financial Services Industry”, 
forthcoming in Australian Journal of Infor  -
mation Systems 
Wieland, V. (2010)
“Fiscal stimulus and the promise of future
spending cuts”, 
in International Journal of Central Banking, 
Vol. 6 (1)  
Wandt, M., Sehrbrock, D. (2010)
“Regelungsziele der Solvency II-Rahmen  -
richtlinie”,
in Festschrift 50 Jahre Schweizerische Ge  -
sellschaft für Haftpflicht- und Versiche  rungs  -
recht, Schulthess 2010
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RESEARCH OUTSIDE THE HOUSE OF FINANCE
DIE REGULIERUNG VON LEERVERKÄUFEN DE LEGE LATA UND DE LEGE FERENDA, Prof. Dr. Daniel Zimmer,
LL.M., University of Bonn, and Thomas Beisken, LL.M., in Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 2010, 485–491.
By sending out wrong signals to market participants, short selling was held responsible for the
excessive volatility of market prices as well as for panic sales. The authors, Professor Daniel
Zimmer and Thomas Beisken, discuss the regulation of short selling. They contrast the possible
risks with the potential economic benefits. This article was triggered by the prohibition on naked
short selling in Germany, as discussed in a draft by the Federal Ministry of Finance. Short selling
is legal here, as long as it does not violate the rules on market manipulation specified under 
§20 a WpHG. Nonetheless, the financial regulator BaFin prohibited naked short selling in
response to the increased sensitivity of volatile markets and the massive price fluctuations that
it causes. While Zimmer and Beisken view short selling as making an important contribution to
the economic efficiency of capital markets, they point out the significant dangers leading up to
systemic risks. They conclude that there was no legal basis for the measures BaFin adopted –
none even in the draft from the Federal Ministry of Finance – and that BaFin even today lacks
the legal authority for this type of action. 
Sebastian Brenner, Marcel Gellings, Goethe University
GENDER AND CORPORATE FINANCE, Jiekun Huang and Darren J. Kisgen, March 16, 2009
In a recent working paper, Jiekun Huang and Darren J. Kisgen from Boston College analyze
whether female chief financial officers (CFOs) differ from male CFOs in their corporate finance
decisions. The authors use a difference-in-differences approach for executive transitions in order
to answer this research question. They find that women make different corporate finance deci-
sions than men. More specifically, firms with female CFOs are less likely to make acquisitions
and issue debt than firms with male CFOs. These findings are found to provide evidence that
women are apparently more scrutinous and exhibit less hubris when undertaking acquisition
decisions. This is consistent with previous literature which finds that men are overconfident and
women more risk averse. Capital markets also react favorably to significant corporate finance
decisions made by firms with female CFOs. For instance, announcement returns are approxi-
mately 2 percent higher in the period around acquisitions made by firms with a female CFO
compared to when acquisitions are made by firms with a male CFO. Additionally, announcement
returns are higher around debt offerings and equity offerings when the firm concerned has a
female CFO. These findings suggest that female CFOs do a better job of maximizing shareholder
value, at least in the aforementioned context.
The full article is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263990
Dr. Patrick Behr, Goethe University
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The European Financial Law Network (EFLN)
held its annual PhD conference from April 22-
23, 2010. This conference was organized by 
Prof. Brigitte Haar, director of the doctoral pro-
gram in Law and Economics of Money and Fi  -
nance, and Prof. Theodor Baums, holder of the
DekaBank/Helaba chair in Law and Finance.
Further members of the network are top-ranked
legal scholars from Luxembourg, Genoa, Gent,
Strasbourg and Geneva. The EFLN is designed to
help select those candidates best-suited for per-
forming the academic dialogue and interdiscipli-
nary research required, given the global dimen-
sion of European financial markets. It also aims
to support and nurture their research by provid-
ing an opportunity to interact with both interna-
tionally respected scholars and fellow doctoral
students from other universities.  The EFLN Seminar Group 
HOUSE OF FINANCE RESEARCHERS WIN AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
Yeon-Jue Emilie Yoo, linked to the Endowed
Chair of Money, Currency and Central Bank
Law, has won a EuroHypo scholarship for her
research project “Multiline Financial Supervi  -
sion in the United States of America”.
Jan Ischdonat, a research assistant at the
Department of Corporate and Financial Law,
has won the first writing contest held by the
Stiftung der Hessischen Rechtsanwaltschaft
(the Hessian Bar Foundation) with his essay on
“Die deutsche Juristenausbildung unter dem
Einfluss des Bologna-Prozesses – Eine kritische
Analyse der aktuellen Reform  modelle”.
E-Finance Lab researchers Prof. Roman Beck
and Robert Gregory, together with Oliver
Marschollek, were presented the best paper
award at the 4th Pre-ICIS International Research
Workshop on IT Project Mana  gement held in
Phoenix, Arizona. 
FILM INDUSTRY MEETS LAW
AND FINANCE
On the eve of the 2010 Cor  po  rate Finance
Summit, Dr. Dieter Wedel held a lecture at a re  -
ception for guests from the financial sector, in  -
dustry, law firms and academia. This successful
German director and screenwriter spoke about
his personal experiences and insights on business
ethics. About 200 executives met for the confer-
ence, the second of its type, proper on May 6,
which was hosted by Commerzbank AG and the
Institute for Law and Finance (ILF).
Prof. Dr. Andreas Cahn, Dr. Dieter Wedel, 
Dr. Rüdiger Theiselmann
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E-FINANCE LAB SPRING
CONFERENCE –
“THE NEW FINANCIAL MARKETS
INFRASTRUCTURE – 
TRADING AND CLEARING”
The 2010 E-Finance Lab Spring Conference on
“The New Financial Markets Infrastructure –
Trading and Clearing” was held on February 23.
The topics discussed included the competition
for execution venues in Europe, algorithmic
trading, and current initiatives for increasing
the integrity and transparency of OTC deriva-
tives markets. There were 380 international
participants from exchanges, clearing houses,
regulators, banks, consultancies and research
institutes, who gave some very positive feed-
back underlining the important role played by
EFL conferences in generating a fruitful interac-
tion between research and industry. 
NEW HANDELSBLATT RANKING
OF ECONOMISTS REITERATES
EXCELLENCY OF HOUSE OF
FINANCE RESEARCH
Prof. Roman Inderst re  tains his position as the
best economist aged be  low 40 years in the new
Han  delsblatt ranking of economists in Ger  man  -
speaking areas. Also among the top 30 in 
this category is Prof. Ester Faia, who joined
Goethe University in 2008, and Prof. Nicola
Fuchs-Schündeln, who is also new to the House
of Fi  nance and previously taught at Harvard
Uni  ver  sity. Meanwhile, Prof. Roman Inderst is
rated fourth in terms of life  time research output.
Prof. Stefan Gerlach joins him in this ranking,
achieving position 22. These good results under-
line that the research being conducted at Goethe
Uni  versity and the House of Finance is consis-
tently of an excellent quality. 
PROF. STEFAN GERLACH NEW
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY  
Prof. Stefan Gerlach suc-
ceeds Prof. Helmut Siek  -
mann who had played a
fundamental role in esta  -
blishing the institute, as
Managing Di  rector of the
Institute for Mone  ta  ry and
Financial Stabi  lity (IMFS).
Prior to joining Goethe
Uni    versity, Prof. Gerlach worked for the Bank
for International Settlements and headed the
Research Department of the Hong Kong Mo  ne  -
tary Authority. He is a member of the Monetary
Experts Panel of the European Par  lia ment’s
Committee on Econo  mic and Mone  tary Affairs. 
Prof. 
Stefan Gerlach 
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
AUGUST
Monday, 16
th CFS and LEMF Summer School: 
Friday, 20
th “Law and Economics of 
8am – 6pm Contracts”
Speaker: Prof. Scott Baker, 
Washington University in St. Louis,
USA,
Prof. Douglas Cumming, 
Schulich School of Business, 
York University, Canada
Wednesday, 25
th – 37
th Annual Meeting of the 
Saturday, 28
th European Finance Association
Program Chair: Jan P. Krahnen
For more information please visit:
http://www.efa2010.org/home.html
Monday, 30
th – ILF Summer Course:
September, Friday, 10
th “Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht”
8am – 4pm  attendance by application only
SEPTEMBER
Friday, 3
rd –  CFS Conference: 
Saturday, 4
th “Dynamics, Economic Growth, 
9am – 6pm and International Trade, 
DEGIT – XV”
Keynote Speakers: Samuel S. Kortum,
University of Chicago,
Olivier de La Grandville, 
University of Geneva 
Monday, 6
th EFL Jour-Fixe: 
5pm IP Telefonie im Bankenumfeld,
Korbinian Humm
Deutsche Bank
Wednesday, 8
th CFS Colloquium: 
5.30pm – 7pm “Wertpapierhandel im Umbruch:
Chancen für Börsen und Ihre
Kunden”
Speaker: Dr. Reto Francioni, 
Deutsche Börse AG
Wednesday, 22
nd CFS Colloquium: 
5.30pm – 7pm “New Architecture for Financial
Regulation”
Speaker: Prof. Charles Goodhardt, 
London School of Economics and
Political Science
Thursday, 23
rd – CFS Research Conference: 
Friday, 24
th “Household Finance”
9am – 6pm Athens, Greece 
Management: Michael Haliassos, 
Goethe University Frankfurt 
(and others)
JULY
Thursday, 1
st MathFinance Colloquium
5.15pm Speaker: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Horst
Monday, 5
th EFL Jour-Fixe:
5pm “Collaboration Structures in
Financial Markets – A Social
Network Analysis of IPO
Syndicates”
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Oliver Hinz
Wednesday, 7
th Brown Bag Seminar Finance
12pm – 1pm Speaker: Grigori Vilkov
Friday, 9
th CFS Research Conference:
8.45am – 5.05pm “ECB and Ist Watchers” 
attendance on request only
Wednesday, 14
th Brown Bag Seminar Finance 
12pm – 1pm Speaker: Ahmed Barakat
Friday,16
th ILF End of Academic Year
Dinner
attendance only on request
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Address:
House of Finance
Goethe University Frankfurt
Grüneburgplatz 1
D-60323 Frankfurt am Main
Contact Person:
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König
Tel. +49 (0)69 798 34000
Fax +49 (0)69 33910
E-Mail: info@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
Internet: www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de
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